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Quality-Of-Service Provisioning in Decentralized
Networks: A Satisfaction Equilibrium Approach
S.M. Perlaza, H. Tembine, S. Lasaulce, and M. Debbah
Abstract—This paper introduces a particular game for-
mulation and its corresponding notion of equilibrium,
namely the satisfaction form (SF) and the satisfaction
equilibrium (SE). A game in SF models the case where
players are uniquely interested in the satisfaction of some
individual performance constraints, instead of individual
performance optimization. Under this formulation, the
notion of equilibrium corresponds to the situation where
all players can simultaneously satisfy their individual
constraints. The notion of SE, models the problem of QoS
provisioning in decentralized self-configuring networks.
Here, radio devices are satisfied if they are able to provide
the requested QoS. Within this framework, the concept
of SE is formalized for both pure and mixed strategies
considering finite sets of players and actions. In both cases,
sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the
SE are presented. When multiple SE exist, we introduce
the idea of effort or cost of satisfaction and we propose a
refinement of the SE, namely the efficient SE (ESE). At the
ESE, all players adopt the action which requires the lowest
effort for satisfaction. A learning method that allows radio
devices to achieve a SE in pure strategies in finite time and
requiring only one-bit feedback is also presented. Finally,
a power control game in the interference channel is used
to highlight the advantages of modeling QoS problems
following the notion of SE rather than other equilibrium
concepts, e.g., generalized Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, in the context of decentralized networks,
a well accepted idea among radio device manufacturers,
network designers and service providers is to consider
radio devices as smart entities able to autonomously
adopt the transmit/receive configuration that allows the
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achievement of certain level of individual quality-of-
service (QoS). In particular, a transmit/receive config-
uration can be described in terms of power allocation
polices, coding-modulation schemes, scheduling polices,
decoding order, etc. Within this framework, the resulting
decentralized radio resource sharing problem can be
analyzed using tools from both non-cooperative game
theory (GT) [1], [2] and variational inequality (VI)
theory [3], [4]. Indeed, strong connections between both
approaches have been already highlighted [5], [6]. From
this point of view, the resulting competitive interaction
through mutual interference between all radio devices
can be modeled by a game in normal form with coupled
action sets (See [2] and references therein). Here, radio
devices are players aiming to optimize an individual
benefit (performance metric) and guarantee certain indi-
vidual constraints (quality-of-service, QoS) by selfishly
choosing their actions, i.e., the transmit/receive config-
urations. In this context, the above mentioned coupling
between the actions sets stems from the fact that the set
of transmit/receive configurations that satisfy the QoS
of a given radio device depend on the configurations
adopted by all the other devices. Under this game
formulation, initially proposed in [7], [8], the notion
of Nash equilibrium (NE) [9] is transformed into the
notion described in [7], which is known nowadays as
generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). The notion of
GNE is already well integrated in the context of QoS
provisioning in decentralized networks. For instance, it
is used in [10] and [11] to model a network where radio
devices aim to minimize the transmit power consumption
while guaranteeing some individual minimum signal
to interference plus noise ratios (SINR). Therein, the
existence and uniqueness of the GNE is discussed. In
particular, both articles provide sufficient conditions for
the convergence of the best response dynamics [12] to
the GNE, in the context of finite action sets (only in
[11]) and convex and closed action sets (in [10] and
[11]). Other examples are provided in [13] and references
therein.
Interestingly, in [5][6], it has been shown that a GNE
can be formulated as VI problem as long as the set of
actions is closed and convex and the utility functions
2are continuously differentiable. From such a formulation,
many conclusions regarding the existence and unique-
ness of the equilibrium can be obtained based on existing
results in VI theory [3]. Additionally, algorithms to
achieve the GNE can be developed based on existing
methods for solving the VI problem, for instance, see
[14][15]. Nonetheless, the use of VI in the context of
decentralized networks is limited since it requires the
explicit expression of the metric projection onto the set
of actions [16], [17], [18]. This condition is particularly
difficult to be satisfied in decentralized networks since
radio devices possess only local information [19]. An
extensive analysis of VI in the context of decentralized
wireless communications is presented in [3].
In this paper, we present a game formulation and its
corresponding notion of equilibrium, namely the satis-
faction form (SF) and the satisfaction equilibrium (SE).
The satisfaction form models the case where players
are concerned by the satisfaction of their individual
constraints but not the optimization of its performance
metric. A game is said to be in SE, when all players
simultaneously satisfy their individual constraints. In the
sequel, we exclusively focus on the case of finite sets,
since we aim to model the fact that radio devices choose
from a finite number of transmit configurations.
The idea behind SE was originally introduced in [20],
[21] for a particular class of conditions in pure strategies
for the case of finite set of actions. Later, the concept
was formulated in terms of a fixed point inclusion for
the case of pure strategies in [22], in the context of
both finite action sets and convex and closed action sets.
The advantages of the notion of SE over the classical
notions such as GNE, at least in the domain of signal
processing for wireless communications are multifold.
Here, we highlight the fact that, (i) the existence of the
SE in pure strategies is less restrictive than the notion
of GNE. That is, a network can possess a SE but not a
GNE. (ii) The behavioral rules to learn a SE are simpler
than behavioral rules to learn GNE [2], [19]. Within this
framework, the contributions presented in this paper are
the followings:
• The notions of SF and SE are formalized in both
pure strategies (PS) and mixed strategies (MS) in
the context of finite games. Conditions for the
existence of the SE in PS and MS are established.
• We introduce the notion of epsilon-satisfaction equi-
librium (ǫ-SE), which consists of a mixed strat-
egy which allows all players to be satisfied with
probability not less than a certain threshold. This
equilibrium concept turns out to be less restrictive
in terms of existence than the SE.
• A refinement of the notion of SE to which we refer
to as efficient SE (ESE) is presented as a mechanism
for equilibrium selection involving the idea of effort
for satisfaction.
• A simple learning algorithm to achieve SE, based
on the algorithms proposed in [21], is presented.
The sequel of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, the QoS provisioning problem in decentralized
self-configuring networks is formulated. In Sec. III, the
notions of SF and SE are presented. In Sec. IV, the
existence and uniqueness of the SE are analyzed. In
Sec. V, we compare the notions of SF and SE with
existing equilibrium notions. In Sec. VI, behavioral rules
that allow radio devices to learn a SE are described. In
Sec. VII, the notion of SE is used in the context of a
simple power control in the interference channel where
transmitters must guarantee a minimum transmission
rate. The paper is concluded by Sec. VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a fully decentralized network where
transmitters communicate with their respective receivers
by sharing a common set of radio resources, and thus,
subject to a competitive interaction. For instance, the
usage of the same frequency bands brings a mutual
interference condition. Within this framework, each radio
device, either a transmitter or receiver, aims to au-
tonomously adjust its transmit/receive configuration in
order to guarantee a communication with certain QoS
level. The QoS can be described by several parameters
depending on the type of services. Some classical ex-
amples are constraints over the transmission rates and
maximum delays. The key point is that the feasibil-
ity of the QoS of each radio device depends on the
configurations adopted by all the other devices in the
network. Regarding the transmit/receive configurations,
we assume that there exists a finite number of feasible
choices for each radio device. In particular, a configura-
tion can be described in terms of channel selection and
power allocation policy, modulation and error correction
schemes, constellation sizes, etc. Similarly, receivers
might tune their scheduling, decoding order, etc.
In this work, we consider that radio devices are selfish
entities aiming to satisfy their QoS individual constraints.
Each device is in particular careless of whether other de-
vices achieve or not their required QoS. Moreover, mes-
sage exchanging between radio devices for establishing
a sort of coordination to jointly improve the individual
or global performance is not considered here. This is
basically because of the amount of signaling it might
require and also because devices are not necessarily able
to communicate due to the use of different physical layer
technologies.
3In the sequel of this article, we intend to provide a
mathematical framework for tackling this problem using
tools from game theory. Particular attention is given
to real-system implementation constraints, for instance
finite number of choices and limited numbers of bits
dedicated to feedback.
III. GAMES IN SATISFACTION FORM AND
SATISFACTION EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we introduce a novel game formulation
where in contrast to existing formulations (e.g., normal
form [9] and normal form with constrained action sets
[7]), the idea of performance optimization, i.e., utility
maximization or cost minimization, does not exist. In our
formulation, to which we refer to as satisfaction-form,
the aim of the players is to adopt any of the actions which
allows them to satisfy a specific condition given the
actions adopted by all the other players. Under this game
formulation, we introduce the concept of satisfaction
equilibrium.
A. Games in Satisfaction Form
In general, a game in satisfaction-form can be de-
scribed by the following triplet
ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) . (1)
Here, the set K = {1, . . . ,K} represents the set of
players and the set Ak = {A(1)k , . . . , A
(Nk)
k } represents
the set of Nk actions available for transmitter k. An
action profile is a vector a = (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ A, where,
A = A1 × . . .×AK . (2)
In this analysis, the sets K and {Ak}k∈K are as-
sumed finite and non-empty. We denote by a−k =
(a1, . . . , ak−1, ak+1, . . . , aK) ∈ A−k, where
A−k = A1 × . . .×Ak−1 ×Ak+1 × . . . ,×AK , (3)
the vector obtained by dropping off the k-th component
of the vector a. With a slight abuse of notation, we write
the vector a as (ak,a−k), in order to emphasize its k-
th component. The correspondence fk : A−k → 2Ak
determines the set of actions of player k which allows
its satisfaction given the actions played by all the other
players. Here, the notation 2Ak refers to the set of
all possible subsets of the set Ak, including Ak. Note
that 2Ak includes also the empty set, which models
the case when one player ends up without an action
that allows the satisfaction of its individual constraints
given the other players’ actions. Often, this is a strong
mathematical constraint and thus, in some sections of
this paper, we assume that none of the correspondences
fk maps the empty set.
In general, an important outcome of a game in satisfac-
tion form is the one where all players are satisfied. We
refer to this game outcome as satisfaction equilibrium
(SE).
Definition 1 (Satisfaction Equilibrium in PS [22]):
An action profile a+ is an equilibrium for the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) if
∀k ∈ K, a+k ∈ fk
Ä
a+−k
ä
. (4)
Note that under this formulation, the outcome where all
players are satisfied is naturally an equilibrium. Here,
since the aim of each player is to be satisfied, none of
them has a particular interest on changing its current
action once they are at the SE. An important remark
here is that, players are assumed to be careless of
whether other players can satisfy or not their individual
constraints. An interesting analysis of the impact of this
assumption in the definition of equilibrium can be found
in [23].
In this context, when DCSN are modeled using the
satisfaction form, radio devices are indifferent to the fact
that there might exist another transmit configuration with
which a higher performance e.g., transmission rate, can
be obtained. Here, as long as each radio device is able to
satisfy its individual QoS conditions, it has no incentive
to unilaterally change its current transmit/receive config-
uration.
In the following example, we show how a given decen-
tralized self-configuring network can be modeled by a
game in satisfaction form.
Example 1: Consider a decentralized and self-
configuring network made of a set K = {1, . . . ,K} of
transmitter-receiver pairs. For all k ∈ K, let Ak be the
set of transmit configurations available for transmitter k
and let the function uk : A1 × . . . × AK → R denote
its (Shannon) transmission rate. Transmitter k must
guarantee a data rate higher than Γk bps. Hence, the set
of configurations it must adopt, given the configurations
a−k of all the other transmitters, is determined by the
correspondence fk : A−k → 2Ak , which we define as
follows,
fk (a−k) = {ak ∈ Ak : uk (ak,a−k) > Γk} . (5)
Thus, the behavior of this network can be modeled by
the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) in satisfaction
form.
In Sec. V, we use this example to highlight the dif-
ferences between the satisfaction form and other game
formulations. In the following, we describe the extension
in mixed strategies of the game in satisfaction form.
4B. Extension in Mixed Strategies of the Satisfaction
Form
The concept of mixed strategies was introduced by
Borel in [24]. A mixed strategy of player k is a probabil-
ity distribution over the set of actions Ak. We denote the
set of all possible probability distributions over the set
Ak by △ (Ak), i.e., the unit simplex over the elements
of Ak. We denote by pik =
(
π
k,A
(1)
k
, . . . , π
k,A
(Nk)
k
)
the probability distribution (mixed strategy) chosen by
player k. Here, for all nk ∈ {1, . . . , Nk}, πk,A(nk)k
represents the probability that player k plays action
A
(nk)
k ∈ Ak.
Following this notation, we denote by ÛG′ =Ä
K, {△ (Ak)}k∈K ,
{
f¯k
}
k∈K
ä
the extension in mixed
strategies of the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K),
where the correspondence
f¯k :
∏
j∈K\{k}
△ (Aj)→ 2
△(Ak), (6)
determines the set of all possible probability distributions
that allow player k to always choose an action which
satisfies its individual conditions, that is,
f¯k (pi−k) = {pik ∈ △ (Ak) : (7)
Pr (ak ∈ fk (a−k) |(pik,pi−k) ) = 1} .
In this context, we define the SE as follows.
Definition 2 (Satisfaction Equilibrium in MS): The
mixed strategy profile pi∗ ∈ △ (A1) × . . . × △ (AK)
is a SE of the game ÛG′ = ÄK, {△ (Ak)}k∈K , {f¯k}k∈Kä,
if for all k ∈ K,
pi∗k ∈ f¯k
(
pi∗−k
)
. (8)
From Def. 2 and (7), it can be implied that if pi∗ ∈
△ (A1)×. . .×△ (AK) is a SE, then the following holds,
for all k ∈ K,
Pr
(
ak ∈ fk (a−k)
∣∣(pi∗k,pi∗−k)) = 1. (9)
Note that it can be stated that the set of equilibria
of the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) is a sub-
set of the set of equilibria of the mixed extensionÛG′ = ÄK, {△ (Ak)}k∈K , {f¯k}k∈Kä, if we establish an
injection from the action set Ak to the canonical basis of
the space of Nk-dimensional vectors RNk . For instance,
let the nk-th action of player k, i.e., A
(nk)
k , be associated
with the unitary vector e(Nk)nk =
(
e
(Nk)
nk,1 , . . . , e
(Nk)
nk,Nk
)
∈
R
(Nk)
, where, all the components of the vector e(Nk)nk
are zero except its nk-th component, which is unitary.
The vector e(Nk)nk represents a degenerated probability
distribution, where the action A(nk)k is deterministically
chosen. Using this argument, it becomes clear that every
SE of the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) is also a
SE in the game ÛG′ = ÄK, {△ (Ak)}k∈K , {f¯k}k∈Kä.
As we shall see in the next section, games in satisfaction
form might not necessarily have a SE neither in pure
strategies nor mixed strategies. Thus, in the following we
present a less restrictive notion of equilibrium to which
we refer to as epsilon-satisfaction equilibrium (ǫ-SE).
C. Epsilon-Satisfaction Equilibrium
At the SE of the game ÛG′ =Ä
K, {△ (Ak)}k∈K ,
{
f¯k
}
k∈K
ä
, players choose their
actions following a probability distribution such
that only action profiles that allow all players to
simultaneously satisfy their individual conditions are
played with positive probability. This interpretation
leads immediately to the conclusion that if it does not
exist at least one action profile that allows all players
to be simultaneously satisfied, then, it does not exists
any SE in the game ÛG′ = ÄK, {△ (Ak)}k∈K , {f¯k}k∈Kä.
However, under certain conditions, it is always possible
to build mixed strategies that allow players to be
satisfied with a probability which is close to 1 , i.e.,
1− ǫ, for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0.
Definition 3 (Epsilon-Satisfaction Equilibrium): Let
ǫ ∈ ]0, 1]. The mixed strategy profile pi∗ ∈ △ (A1) ×
. . . ×△ (AK) is an epsilon-satisfaction equilibrium (ǫ-
SE) of the game ÛG′ = ÄK, {△ (Ak)}k∈K , {f¯k}k∈Kä, if
for all k ∈ K, it follows that
pi∗k ∈ f¯k
(
pi∗−k
)
, (10)
where
f¯k
(
pi∗−k
)
= {pik ∈ △ (Ak) : (11)
Pr
(
ak ∈ fk (a−k)
∣∣(pik,pi∗−k)) > 1− ǫ} .
From Def. 3, it can be implied that if the mixed strategy
profile pi∗ is an ǫ-SE, it holds that,
Pr
(
ak ∈ fk (a−k)
∣∣(pi∗k,pi∗−k)) > 1− ǫ. (12)
That is, players are unsatisfied with probability ǫ. The
relevance of the ǫ-SE is that it models the fact that
players can be tolerant to a non-satisfaction level. At a
given ǫ-SE, none of the players is interested in changing
its mixed strategy profile as long as it is satisfied with
a probability higher than certain threshold 1− ǫ. As we
shall see, a game might not possess a SE neither in pure
nor mixed strategies, but it might possess an ǫ-SE.
A thorough analysis on the existence and uniqueness
of the SE in pure strategies and mixed strategies is
presented in the next section. Similarly, the conditions
for the existence of an ǫ-SE are also discussed.
5IV. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE
SATISFACTION EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the existence and uniqueness
of a satisfaction equilibrium in games in satisfaction
form and its corresponding extension in mixed strategies.
Particular attention is given to the existence of ǫ-SE in
the case where it does not exist at least one SE neither
in pure nor in mixed strategies.
A. Existence of SE in Pure Strategies
In order to study the existence of a SE in the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K), let the correspondence
F : A → 2A be defined as follows:
F (a) = f1 (a−1)× . . .× fK (a−K) . (13)
Then, a SE exists if and only if
∃a ∈ A : a ∈ F (a). (14)
This formulation allows us to use existing fixed point
(FP) theorems to provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of the SE. For instance, one can rely on the
fixed point theorem of Knaster and Tarski [25] to state
the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Existence of SE in finite games): Con-
sider the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) and let the
set A have a binary relation denoted by . Let also
(i) V = 〈A,〉 be a complete lattice;
(ii) F (a) be non-empty for all a ∈ A;
(iii) the correspondence F in (13) satisfies that
∀ (a,a′) ∈ A2, such that a  a′, it holds that
∀
(
b, b′
)
∈ F (a)× F
(
a′
)
, b  b′. (15)
Then the game has at least one SE in pure strategies.
Note that theorem 4 requires that for all a ∈ A, the set
F (a) is non-empty, i.e.,
∀k ∈ K and ∀a−k ∈ A−k, ∃ak ∈ Ak : ak ∈ fk (a−k) .
(16)
In some cases, this condition might appear restrictive.
However, in the general context of wireless commu-
nications, when a radio device might not provide its
QoS, the default action is simply going into standby.
This might imply the existence of an action “do nothing
(DN)” which might appear to avoid the emptiness of
fk(a−k), whenever it is required. Modeling the existence
of the DN action strongly depends on the scenario. For
instance, in the case of power allocation games, such
action can be the null vector, that is, zero transmit power.
In the following, we study the existence of an equilib-
rium in mixed strategies and an ǫ-SE, which appear to
be less restrictive.
B. Existence of the SE in Mixed Strategies
As in the case of pure strategies, the condition for
the existence of a SE in the mixed extension ÛG′ =Ä
K, {△ (Ak)}k∈K ,
{
f¯k
}
k∈K
ä
boils down to the study
of a fixed point inclusion. Let the correspondence F¯ :
△ (A1)× . . .×△ (AK)→ 2
△(A1)×...×△(AK) be defined
as follows:
F¯ (pi) = f¯1 (pi−1)× . . .× f¯K (pi−K) . (17)
Then, a SE exists if and only if
∃pi ∈ △ (A1)× . . .×△ (AK) : pi ∈ F¯ (pi). (18)
Thus, all the results of fixed point theory [26], in
the case of the compact and convex sets, are valid
for the study of the existence of the SE in the gameÛG′ = ÄK, {△ (Ak)}k∈K , {f¯k}k∈Kä. Nonetheless, some
results are immediate from Def. 2. For instance, note that
if a game in satisfaction form does not have a SE in pure
strategies, then, it does not have a SE in mixed strategies
neither. This is basically due to the fact that players mix
only the actions that guarantee their satisfaction with
unitary probability. That is, player k mixes a subset of
its actions A′k ⊆ Ak, i.e., ∀ak ∈ A′k, πk,ak > 0, only if
the following condition holds, ∀a∗k ∈ A′k,
Pr (a∗k ∈ fk (a−k) |pi−k ) = 1. (19)
This implies that player k assigns a strictly positive
probability to more than one action, i.e., it plays strictly
mixed strategies, only if such a set of actions guarantees
its satisfaction for all the action profiles a−k ∈ A−k,
which are played with non-zero probability. This rea-
soning might imply that, there might exist several SE in
pure strategies but no SE in strictly mixed strategies in
the game ÛG′ = ÄK, {△ (Ak)}k∈K , {f¯k}k∈Kä.
C. Existence of the Epsilon-Satisfaction Equilibrium
As shown in the previous subsection, the existence of
at least one SE in the extension in mixed strategies of the
game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) remains very strict.
Indeed, the game has a SE in mixed strategies if and
only if it has a SE in pure strategies. On the contrary,
the existence of at least one ǫ-SE is less strict and it
does not require the existence of a pure SE. A sufficient
and necessary condition for the existence of at least one
ǫ-SE is the following.
Proposition 5: Let ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) be
a finite game in satisfaction form. Then, if the following
condition holds,
∀k ∈ K, ∃a ∈ A : ak ∈ fk (a−k) , (20)
6there always exists a strategy profile pi∗ ∈ △ (A1) ×
. . . × △ (AK) and an 1 > ǫ > 0, such that, pi∗ is an
ǫ-SE.
Proof: Assume that the condition (20) holds. Then,
for all j ∈ K, it holds that the set
A∗j = {a ∈ A : aj ∈ fj (a−j)} (21)
is non-empty. Denote by a∗j =
Ä
a∗j,1, . . . , a
∗
j,K
ä
a par-
ticular element of the set A∗j . Any mixed strategy pi+ ∈
△ (A1)× . . .×△ (AK), such that
∀(j, k) ∈ K2, π+k,a∗
j,k
> 0 (22)
guarantees that ∀j ∈ K, the action a∗j is played with
non-zero probability, thus, ∀k ∈ K,
Pr
(
ak ∈ fk (a−k)
∣∣∣pi+) = ∑
a∈A
1{ak∈fk(a−k)}
K∏
j=1
π+j,aj
= ǫk, (23)
where 1 > ǫk >
K∏
j=1
π+j,a∗k,j > 0, which proves the
existence of a mixed strategy profile such that, ∀k ∈ K,
Pr
(
ak ∈ fk (a−k)
∣∣∣pi+) > 1− ǫ, (24)
where, ǫ = 1−min
j∈K
ǫj , which completes the proof.
Note that for all k ∈ K, the condition (20) only requires
the existence of at least one action profile where player
k is satisfied, which is less restrictive than conditions
(14) and (18). Note also that, as long as (20) holds, a
simple uniform distribution over each individual set of
actions Ak is an ǫ-SE. Indeed, under the assumption of
a uniform probability distribution, the following lower
bound can be identified ǫ > 1 −
K∏
j=1
1
Nj
. Indeed, strict
equality is observed in a game with no SE in pure
strategies and satisfying that ∀k ∈ K, there exists a
unique action profile a(k) such that a(nk)k ∈ fk
(
a
(nk)
−k
)
and ∀(j, k) ∈ K2, a(j) 6= a(k).
D. Multiplicity of the SE and Equilibrium Selection
In general, it is difficult to provide the conditions to
observe a unique SE for a general set of correspondences
{fk}k∈K. As we shall see in Sec. VII, the set of SE is
often not unique in games modeling decentralized self-
configuring wireless networks, and thus, an equilibrium
selection process might be required.
We start our analysis pointing the fact that using a
higher transmit power level or using a more complex
modulation scheme (e.g., in the sense of the size of
the constellation) might require a higher energy con-
sumption and thus, reduce the battery life time of the
transmitters. In this scenario, one might imply that radio
devices are interested in satisfying their required QoS
with the lowest effort. Here, we can express the effort,
for instance, in terms of energy consumption or signal
processing complexity.
In the following, our interest is to select an action profile
which allows all the players to be satisfied with the
lowest effort. We refer to this action profile as efficient
satisfaction equilibrium (ESE).
The game where each player aims to satisfy its QoS
with the minimum effort can be formulated as a game
in normal form with constrained set of actions,
G˜ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
. (25)
Here, for all k ∈ K, the cost function ck : Ak → [0, 1]
satisfies the following condition, ∀(ak, a′k) ∈ A2k, it holds
that
ck (ak) < ck
(
a′k
)
, (26)
if and only if, ak requires a lower effort than action a′k
when it is played by player k. For instance, if transmitters
are choosing the transmit power level, one can consider
the cost function ck as the identity function, that is, the
transmitters are concerned by the amount of power they
use on their transmissions.
Following this reasoning, the set of ESE of the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K), with respect to the cost
functions ck, corresponds to the set of GNE of the game
G˜ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
.
It is important to note that in the game G˜ =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
, the competitive in-
teraction between all players is not modeled by the cost
functions {ck}k∈K. For instance, the cost function of
player k, ck, depends only on its chosen action ak. In
this game formulation G˜, the interaction between players
is modeled by the correspondence fk, which is defined
over the set of action profiles A−k.
An important remark here is that if all players assign the
same cost (or effort) to all their actions, then the sets of
ESE and the set of SE are identical. This implies that the
interest of the formulation G˜ is precisely that players can
differentiate the effort of playing one action or another in
order to select one (satisfaction) equilibrium among all
the existing equilibria of the game ÛG. Thus, the existence
and uniqueness of this efficient SE plays an important
role in the equilibrium selection. We analyze these two
properties in the sequel of this section.
1) Existence of an ESE: The main results on the
existence of an ESE are based on the fact that the game
G˜ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
is a potential
7game with constrained actions sets (see Appendix A),
as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 6: The game G˜ =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
is an exact
constrained potential game, with potential function
φ : A → R, such that, ∀a ∈ A,
φ (a) =
K∑
k=1
ck (ak) . (27)
This simple observation allows us to obtain immediate
results on the existence of the ESE:
Proposition 7 (Existence of the ESE): The game
G˜ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
) (25) has at least
one efficient SE if the graphs of the correspondences
f1, . . . , fK are non-empty and identical.
The proof of Prop. 7 follows from Th. 14 in Appendix
A. Other results, on the existence of an ESE and more
importantly on the convergence of the best response
dynamics [19] to achieve an ESE are immediately ob-
tained by exploiting properties such as supermodularity
or submodularity of the potential function (See [11]).
2) Multiplicity of an ESE: One the desirable features
of the ESE is to be unique. In particular, this will
allow engineers to estimate the operating point of decen-
tralized networks. However, from existing literature in
constrained games [11], it can be stated that uniqueness
is observed only under certain conditions. Thus, in
Appendix B, we provide a general method to analyze
the number of ESE of a given game G˜. This method
is basically a tool for the network analysis, it does
not pretend to be an algorithm which can be directly
implemented in networks.
In the next section, we compare the SE notion with
existing equilibrium concepts such as NE and GNE.
V. SATISFACTION EQUILIBRIUM AND OTHER
EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
In the following, we highlight the main differences
between the SE and other equilibrium notions such as
NE and GNE. However, before we start, we point out the
differences between the normal form and the satisfaction
form formulations.
A. Games in Normal Form and Satisfaction Form
The main difference between the normal form G =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
and the satisfaction form ÛG =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
is that the former defines a
preference order [27], which can be modeled by a
family of utility functions u1, . . . , uK in the sense
of von Neumann - Morgenstern [28], i.e., given an
action profile a−k ∈ A−k, player k can rank any
pair of its actions (ak, a′k) ∈ A2k such that ei-
ther uk(ak,a−k) < uk(a′k,a−k), uk(ak,a−k) =
uk(a
′
k,a−k) or uk(ak,a−k) > uk(a
′
k,a−k). In the latter,
player k determines only whether an action satisfies
its individual conditions or not, i.e., ak ∈ fk (a−k)
or ak /∈ fk (a−k), respectively. Hence, the satisfaction
form does not require the existence of a utility function
[29], [2] but a satisfaction correspondence fk, which
can be seen as an additional degree of freedom of this
formulation.
An interesting observation is that, by assuming a utility
function of the form uk : A → {0, 1} a game in normal
form can also be used to describe a situation when
players are interested only on the satisfaction of their
individual constraints. Nonetheless, the notions of Nash
equilibrium (NE) and SE do not necessarily correspond
to each other. The NE in pure strategies in the context
of games in normal form [30] can be defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Nash Equilibrium in PS[9]): Consider
a game G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
in normal form.
An action profile a ∈ A is an NE in pure strategies if it
satisfies, for all k ∈ K and for all a′k ∈ Ak,
uk(ak,a−k) > uk(a
′
k,a−k). (28)
Now, consider the Ex. 1 and define the game in sat-
isfaction form ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K), with fk
defined by (5) and a game in normal form G =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
, with uk : A1 × . . . × AK →
{0, 1} defined as follows:
uk (ak,a−k) = 1{ak∈fk(a−k)}. (29)
Now, we compare both the set of SE ASE of the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) and the set of NE ANE
of the game G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
. Note that
from Def. 8 and Def. 1, it can be immediately implied
that any SE of the game ÛG is an NE of the game G.
This is basically, because at the SE, all players obtain a
unitary utility, and since the range of the utility function
is binary {0, 1}, no other action is able to give a higher
utility. The converse is not true, that is, an NE of the
game G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
is not necessar-
ily a SE of the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K).
Consider for instance the game realization (K =
2, N1 = N2 = 2) in Fig. 1. Note that therein,
the game G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
has 2 NE
in pure strategies, which are the action profiles
(A
(2)
1 , A
(1)
2 ) and (A
(1)
1 , A
(2)
2 ), while the game ÛG =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
has only one SE, which is the
action profile (A(1)1 , A
(2)
2 ). This simple example shows
that, the formulation in normal-form might lead to equi-
libria where not all the players are satisfied even when
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2 A
(2)
2
A
(1)
1 (0, 0) (1, 1)
A
(2)
1 (1, 0) (0, 0)
Fig. 1. Game in normal form G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
, with
K = {1, 2}, Ak = {A
(1)
k , A
(2)
k }, for all k ∈ K. Player 1 chooses
rows and player 2 chooses columns. In a pair (v1, v2) ∈ {0, 1}2, v1
and v2 are the utilities obtained by player 1 and 2, respectively.
the joint satisfaction of all players is feasible. This shows
that games in normal-form do not properly model the
case where players are interested only in the satisfaction
of individual conditions. We conclude the comparison
between the games G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
andÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K), by establishing the fol-
lowing condition between their sets of equilibria,
ASE ⊆ ANE ⊆ A. (30)
This confirms the intuition that the notion of SE is more
restrictive than the notion of NE, that is, an SE in the
game ÛG is a Pareto optimal NE in the game G, that is,
an action profile where all players are satisfied.
B. Satisfaction Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium
The definition of NE (Def. 8) can be obtained from
the definition of SE (Def. 1) by assuming that, for all
k ∈ K, the satisfaction correspondence fk is defined as
follows,
fk (a−k) = arg max
a∗
k
∈Ak
uk (a
∗
k,a−k) . (31)
The satisfaction correspondence fk as defined in (31)
is known in the game theoretic literature as the best
response correspondence [30]. Then, under this formula-
tion, the set of SE of the game in satisfaction form ÛG =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
is identical to the set of NE of
the game in normal form G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
.
This reasoning might lead us to think that the satisfaction
form as well as the notion of SE are generalizations
of the classical normal form and the notion of Nash
equilibrium [9], respectively.
C. Satisfaction Equilibrium and Generalized Nash Equi-
librium
The GNE in pure strategies (PS) in games in normal
form with constrained set of actions, as introduced by
Debreu in [7] and later by Rosen in [8], can be defined
as follows.
Definition 9 (Generalized NE in PS [7]): An action
profile a∗ ∈ A is a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)
of the game Gˆ = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) if
and only if
∀k ∈ K, a∗k ∈ fk
(
a∗−k
)
and
∀ak ∈ fk
(
a∗−k
)
, uk(a
∗
k,a
∗
−k) > uk(ak,a
∗
−k).
Note that the definition of SE (Def. 1) can be obtained
from the definition of GNE (Def. 9) by assuming the
following condition, ∀k ∈ K and ∀a ∈ A
uk(ak,a−k) = c, with c ∈ R+. (32)
Under assumption (32), the set of GNE of the game
in normal form with constrained set of actions Gˆ =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
and the set of SE of
the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) in satisfaction
form are identical. This observation does not necessarily
imply that the satisfaction form as well as the notion of
SE are particular cases of the classical normal form with
constrained set of actions and the notion of GNE [7],
respectively. Indeed, there exist fundamental differences:
(i) in the game Gˆ, the set of available actions for player
k are determined by the complementary vector a−k. On
the contrary, in the game ÛG, the set of available actions
of player k is always the set Ak. (ii) In the game Gˆ,
a rational player k determines the action to play ak by
following two different steps. First, it determines the set
of available actions fk(a−k) and second, it determine the
actions ak ∈ fk(a−k) that maximize uk. In contrast, in
the game ÛG, player k does not require any optimization
capability. (iii) In the game Gˆ, the interpretation of
fk(a−k) = ∅ is that player k cannot play since none
of its actions is available given the actions of the others
a−k. On the contrary, in the game ÛG, the interpretation
of fk(a−k) = ∅ is that player k can take any of its
actions ak ∈ Ak, but none of them achieves satisfaction.
This difference might appear subtile but it makes a
strong difference when the equilibrium must be learnt
dynamically [19]. Indeed, in an eventual exploration
phase of a learning algorithm, at each stage, player k
always has a non-empty set of actions to test in the
game ÛG regardless of the actions of all the other players.
Clearly, this is not the case in the game Gˆ, which
constraints the learning process.
In the following, we compare the set of equilibria of
both games Gˆ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
andÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K), for a general definition of
the utility functions uk, for all k ∈ K. Let the sets of
GNE of the game Gˆ and the set of SE of the game ÛG
be denoted by AGNE and ASE, respectively. Now, note
that from Def. 9 and Def. 1, it follows that any GNE in
Gˆ is a SE in ÛG, i.e.,
AGNE ⊆ ASE ⊆ A. (33)
9The strict equality AGNE = ASE is achieved when the
functions uk are chosen following (32). The condition
in (33) verifies the intuition that the notion of SE in
games in satisfaction form, is less restrictive than the
notion of GNE in games in normal form with constrained
action sets. Note also that from Def. 1, it might be
implied that several SE might exist, while no GNE
necessarily exists. This is basically due to the fact that
the existence of a GNE depends on both the functions
uk and fk, while the existence of a SE depends uniquely
on the correspondences fk, with k ∈ K. Conversely, the
existence of a GNE implies the existence of at least one
SE.
In the following, we focus on designing behavioral rules
for the radio devices in order to let them to learn one
satisfaction equilibrium in decentralized self-configuring
networks.
VI. LEARNING SATISFACTION EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study a behavioral rule that allows
radio devices to learn a satisfaction equilibrium in a fully
decentralized fashion. Here, the underlying assumption
is that players do not need to observe the value of its
achieved utility, i.e., transmission rate, energy efficiency,
etc., but only to know whether they are satisfied or not at
each stage of the learning process. This implies only a 1-
bit length message exchange between the corresponding
transmitter-receiver pairs. In the following, we formulate
the corresponding learning problem and later, we intro-
duce the behavioral rules that allow players to learn the
SE.
A. The Learning Problem Formulation
We describe the SE learning process in terms of
elements of the game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) as
follows. Assume that time is divided in intervals and
denote each interval by the index n ∈ N. Each interval
ends when each player has played at most once. Denote
the action taken by player k at interval n by ak(n). At
each interval n, player k observes whether it is satisfied
or not, i.e., it observes a binary variable
v˜k(n) = 1{ak(n)∈fk(a−k(n))}. (34)
Our intention is to learn at least one SE by letting
the players to interact following particular behavioral
rules. We say that players learn an equilibrium in pure
strategies if, after a given finite number of time inter-
vals, all players have chosen an action which achieves
satisfaction, and thus, no other action update takes place.
B. Learning the SE in Pure Strategies
Before we present the behavioral rule which allows
players to achieve one of the equilibrium of the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K), we state the following
hypothesis:
(i) The game ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) has at
least one SE in pure strategies.
(ii) For all k ∈ K, it holds that ∀a−k ∈ A−k, the set
fk (a−k) is not empty.
(iii) The sets K and {Ak}k∈K, are finite.
The first hypothesis ensures that the SE learning problem
is well-posed, i.e., radio devices are assigned a feasible
task. The second hypothesis refers to the fact that, each
radio device is always able to find a transmit/receive
configuration with which it can be considered satisfied
given the transmit/receive configuration of all the other
radio devices. This assumption might appear restrictive
but it is not necessarily the case, see the discussion on the
“do nothing” action in Sec. IV-A. The third hypothesis is
considered in order to ensure that our algorithm is able
to converge in finite time.
Under the assumption that all hypothesis hold, each
player chooses its own action as follows. The first action
of player k, denoted by ak(0), is taken following an
arbitrary probability distribution pˆik(0) ∈ △ (Ak). Often,
such a probability pˆik(0) is the uniform probability
distribution. At time interval n > 0, player k changes its
action if and only if it is not satisfied, i.e, v˜k(n−1) = 0.
In this case, the next action is chosen following a
probability distribution pˆik(n) to which we refer to as
probability distribution of exploration. If player k is
satisfied i.e, v˜k(n − 1) = 1, then, it keeps playing the
same action. Hence, we can write that,
ak(n) =
®
ak(n− 1) if v˜k(n− 1) = 1
ak(n) ∼ pˆik(n) if v˜k(n− 1) = 0
. (35)
The behavioral rule (35) is based on the proposal in [21].
Here, note that a larger class of individual constraints
can be considered due to the formulation of (34). Under
this formulation, the room for optimization is on the
design of pˆik(n) and its evolution over time. However,
we left this issue out of the scope of the paper and no
particular probability distribution is assumed. We for-
malize the behavioral rule (35) in the Alg. 1. Regarding
the convergence of this behavioral rule, we provide the
following proposition.
Proposition 10: The behavioral rule (35) with prob-
ability distributions pik =
(
π
k,A
(1)
k
, . . . , π
k,A
(Nk)
k
)
∈
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Algorithm 1 Learning the SE of the Game ÛG =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
) [Player k ∈ K]
Require: At each instant n > 0: v˜k(n).
1: n = 0;
2: ∀nk ∈ {1, . . . , Nk},
vˆ
k,A
(nk)
k
(0) = 0,
πˆ
k,A
(nk)
k
(0) =
1
Nk
.
3: ak(0) ∼ pˆik(0);
4: for all n > 0 do
5: ∀nk ∈ {1, . . . , Nk}, update pˆik(n).
6:
ak(n) =
®
ak(n− 1) if v˜k(n− 1) = 1
ak(n) ∼ pˆik(n) otherwise.
end
△ (Ak), with k ∈ K, converges to a SE of the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) in finite time if for all
k ∈ K and for all nk ∈ {1, . . . , Nk}, it holds that,
π
k,A
(nk)
k
(n) > 0, (36)
at each time interval n ∈ N, and assumptions (i), (ii)
and (iii) always hold.
The proof of Prop. 10 follows simply from the fact that
(36) implies that every action profile will be played at
least once with non-zero probability during a sufficiently
large time interval. Then, since at least one SE exists,
this action profile will be played at least once. Now,
from (35), it follows that once a SE is played, no
player changes its current action. Thus, convergence is
observed.
From the reasoning above, it can be concluded that any
probability distribution pˆik(n) such that all actions have
a non-zero probability of being played, for all n, can
be chosen as the probability distribution of exploration.
However, the choice of this probability distributions
might impact the convergence time. Two particular ways
for building the probability distribution pˆik(n) are pro-
posed in [21]. In the first case, a uniform probability
distribution during the whole learning process was used.
That is, for all k ∈ K and for all nk ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
πˆ
k,A
(nk)
k
(n) =
1
Nk
. (37)
In the second case, at time interval n, higher probabilities
are assigned to actions which have been played a smaller
number of times during all time intervals between 0 and
n − 1. Let T
k,A
(nk)
k
(n) ∈ N, with k ∈ K and nk ∈
{1, . . . , Nk}, be the number of times that player k has
played action A(nk)k up to time interval n, i.e.,
T
k,A
(nk)
k
(n) =
n−1∑
s=0
1{
ak(s)=A
(nk)
k
}. (38)
Then, the probability distribution to select the next action
is the following:
πˆ
k,A
(nk)
k
(n) =
1
T
k,A
(nk)
k
(n)
Nk∑
m=1
1
T
k,A
(m)
k
(n)
, (39)
where T
k,A
(nk)
k
(0) = δ, with δ > 0.
C. Clipping Strategies and SE
The behavioral rule (35) converges to a SE in pure
strategies in finite time. However, in real system sce-
narios, it is often observed that there might exists an
action from a given player, which achieves satisfaction
regardless of the actions adopted by all the other players.
We refer to this kind of actions as clipping actions [22].
Definition 11 (Clipping Action): In the game ÛG =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
, a player k ∈ K is said to have
a clipping action ak ∈ Ak if
∀a−k ∈ A−k, ak ∈ fk (a−k) . (40)
As shown in the following proposition, the ex-
istence of clipping actions in the game ÛG =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
might inhibit the convergence
of the behavioral rule in (35).
Proposition 12: Consider the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) in satisfaction form.
Assume the existence of at least one clipping action
and denote it by a∗k ∈ Ak for player k, with k ∈ K.
Then, if there exists a player j ∈ K \ {k}, for which
fj
Ä
a∗k,a−{j,k}
ä
= ∅, ∀a−{j,k} ∈
∏
i∈K\{j,k}
Ai. Then, the
behavioral rule in (35) does not converge to a SE with
strictly positive probability.
The proof of Prop. 12 follows from the fact that at time
n > 0 before convergence, the probability that player
k plays the clipping action a∗k is strictly positive (36).
If player k plays a∗k, by definition, there exist a player
j 6= k which would never be satisfied. Then, the be-
havioral rule does not converge to any SE. Nonetheless,
simple alternatives can be used to solve this problem.
For instance, the behavioral rule in (35) can be modified
such that a player changes its current action (using a
given probability distribution over the actions) even if it
is satisfied when it sees the other players not satisfied
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during a long period. Nonetheless, in this case, players
would need to have more than 1-bit feedback in order
to detect the non-satisfaction of the others. For instance,
the feedback of the instantaneous value of the metric
performance. This approach can be compared with the
idea of epsilon experimentation discussed in [31].
VII. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply the concept of SE to the case
of a classical interference channel [32] with 2 pairs of
transmitter-receiver pairs sharing a common bandwidth.
Here, the notion of SE are compared with the existing
equilibrium notions such as GNE. At the same time, the
performance of the behavioral rules presented in Sec. VI
is evaluated in terms of convergence time to a satisfaction
equilibrium.
A. Satisfaction Equilibrium in the Interference Channel
Consider a set K = {1, 2} of two transmitter-receiver
pairs simultaneously operating over the same frequency
band and thus, subject to mutual interference. Each
transmitter communicates only with its corresponding
receiver and any kind of message exchange aiming to
achieve transmit cooperation is not considered. For all
(j, k) ∈ K2, denote by gj,k and p(nk)k the channel gain
between transmitter k and receiver j, and the nk-th
transmit power level of transmitter k, respectively. We
denote by Ak =
{
p
(1)
k , . . . , p
(Nk)
k
}
, the set of all possible
transmit power levels of player k. For all k ∈ K, the
minimum transmit power is p(1)k = 0 and the maximum
transmit power is p(Nk)k = pk,max. The QoS metric,
denoted by uk : A1 × A2 → R+, of the transmitter-
reciever pair k is its (Shannon) transmission rate in bits
per second (bps). Thus, for all (pk, p−k) ∈ Ak × A−k,
we write that,
uk (pk, p−k) = log2
Ç
1 +
pkgk,k
σ2k + p−kgk,−k
å
[bps/Hz].
(41)
Here, σ2k is the noise level at receiver k and we denote
the signal to noise ratio at the transmitter k by SNRk =
pk,max
σ2k
. The QoS requirement for player k is to provide
a transmission rate higher than Γk bps. Thus, we model
the satisfaction correspondence fk, as follows,
fk
(
p−k
)
= {pk ∈ Ak : uk (pk, p−k) > Γk} . (42)
We assume also that transmitters associate different
effort measures with each of their power levels. The
higher the transmit power, the higher the effort.
This scenario is modeled by a game in satisfac-
tion form ÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) and a game
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Fig. 2. Achievable (Shannon) transmission rates
(u1(p1, p2), u2(p1, p2)), for all (p1, p2) ∈ A1 × A2, with
SNR =
pk,max
σ2
k
= 10 dBs, (Γ1,Γ2) = (1.5, 1.5) bps and
N1 = N2 = 32 power levels.
in normal form with constrained action sets Gˆ =Ä
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K , {f
′
k}k∈K
ä
, where, for all k ∈
K, the cost or effort function ck is defined as follows
ck (pk) =
{
pk,max + δ if pk = p
(1)
k
pk if pk ∈ {p
(2)
k , . . . , p
(Nk)
k },(43)
where δ > 0. Note that the most costly action is not to
transmit. This choice is made to force the radio devices
to transmit any time it is possible. The correspondence
f ′k is defined as follows:
f ′k
(
p−k
)
=
®
fk
(
p−k
)
if f ′k
(
p−k
)
6= ∅
p
(1)
k otherwise . (44)
Here, we include the non-transmission action p(1)k = 0
in order to avoid an empty set of actions for players k,
when it does not exists an action able to achieve the
required minimum rate.
Note that if the following holds, ∀k ∈ K, ∃pk ∈ Ak,
such that
log2
Ç
1 +
pk,gk,k
σ2k + p−k,maxgk,−k
å
> Γk, (45)
the existence of at least one SE in ensured from Theorem
4. Note that under such an assumption fk(a−k) is never
empty (condition (ii)) and by establishing the compari-
son bigger or equal than (>) as the binary relation  in
A, the condition (i) and (iii) are always verified.
In Fig. 2, we plot (in red circles) all the achievable (Shan-
non) transmission rates for both transmitters, i.e., the
pairs (u1(p1, p2), u2(p1, p2)), for all (p1, p2) ∈ A1×A2
and a particular channel realization. All the equilibria of
the games ÛG and Gˆ are plotted. The game Gˆ has a unique
equilibrium which is the pair (0, p2,max) (see (Def. 9) and
reference point (p1,max, p2,max) in Fig. 2). The game ÛG
has multiple equilibria (Def. 1). In particular, note that
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Fig. 3. Histogram of the convergence time to a SE in the gameÛG = (K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K) using the algorithm (Alg. 1). Here,
SNR =
pk,max
σ2
k
= 10 dBs, (Γ1,Γ2) = (1.5, 1.5) bps and N1 =
N2 = 32 power levels.
with the game in normal form with constrained strate-
gies, it is not possible to simultaneously satisfy the QoS
of both transmitters. In this case, only transmitter 2 can
be satisfied. On the contrary, in the game formulated in
satisfaction form, all players are able to satisfy their QoS
demands at the equilibrium of the game. Importantly,
the ESE satisfies the QoS condition for both transmitters
with the lowest transmit power, while all the other SE
requires a higher transmission power. In particular, note
that (with this particular channel realization) the set
of GNE and ESE appear to be unitary. However, as
shown before, the existence and uniqueness of the ESE
and GNE are conditioned in general. With this simple
example, we have shown that by including the notion
of performance maximization, i.e., the notion of GNE,
leads to an unsatisfying game outcome, where only one
player is satisfied, while the simultaneous satisfaction of
both players is feasible.
B. Clipping Actions in the Interference Channel
Note that the game ÛG with the particular channel
realization used in Fig. 2 possess at least one clipping
action. For instance, when transmitter 2 transmits at
the maximum power p2,max, it is always satisfied even
if player 1 transmits at the maximum power (see the
reference point (p1,max, p2,max) in Fig. 2 ). At the same
time, if player 2 transmits at the maximum power, player
1 is unable to achieve satisfaction. Hence, if before
observing convergence, transmitter 2 uses, for instance,
its maximum transmit power, then convergence to a SE
is not observed neither in finite nor infinite time.
In Fig. 4, we show a histogram of the convergence or
not convergence of the algorithm. Here, we say that the
algorithm does not convergence if during 100 consec-
utive time intervals, a given player does not change its
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Fig. 4. Histogram of the event of convergence or non-
convergence of the learning algorithm (Alg. 1) in the game ÛG =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
. Here, SNR = pk,max
σ2
k
= 10 dBs,
(Γ1,Γ2) = (1.5, 1.5) bps and N1 = N2 = 32 power levels.
current action, while the other still does (this implies that
a clipping action might be being played). At each trial of
the algorithm, we use the same channel realization used
in Fig. 2. Note that independently of the probability dis-
tributions pˆik(n) adopted by player k to try new actions,
the event of one player playing a clipping strategy is non-
negligible (0.3). In the particular case of the interference
channel as treated here, the corresponding game is free
of clipping actions if the simultaneous transmission at
maximum power allows satisfaction. However, in this
case, the distinction between SE and NE looses its
importance since both equilibrium concepts would be
able to give a satisfactory solution to the QoS problem.
This observation leaves open the way for further research
on learning algorithms in the context of the SE in the
presence of clipping actions.
C. Convergence Time to the SE
Now, our interest focuses on the average time for
converging to one SE of the game ÛG, when convergence
is observed in the previous experiment. The convergence
time is measured as the number of action updates re-
quired to each transmitter before convergence. In Fig. 3,
we show a histogram of the convergence time when play-
ers try new actions with the probability distribution in
(37) and (39). Note that in this particular scenario, using
a probability different from the uniform distribution does
not bring a significant improvement. Interestingly, the
histogram shows that if convergence is observed, most
of the time (80%), satisfaction is achieved in less than
20 time intervals (action updates).
In Fig. 5, we plot the achieved transmission rate of both
links at each instant n when the behavioral rule (35)
is used. Therein, it can be observed that even though
a transmitter is satisfied, and thus does not change its
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Fig. 5. Instantaneous achieved rates of transmitter 1 (red) and 2
(blue).Here, SNR = pk,max
σ2
k
= 10 dBs, (Γ1,Γ2) = (1.5, 1.5) bps
and N1 = N2 = 32 power levels.
transmission power level, its instantaneous transmission
rate changes due to the action updates of the other
transmitters. Once both transmitters are satisfied, then,
none of them changes its transmit powers.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The game formulation in satisfaction form (SF) and
the notion of satisfaction equilibrium (SE) introduced
in this paper have been shown to be neatly adapted to
model the problem of QoS provisioning in decentralized
self-configuring networks. At the SE, all players are
satisfied. On the contrary, when the QoS provisioning
problem is modeled by games in classical normal form
or normal form with constrained set of actions, equilibria
where not all the players achieves satisfaction might be
observed, even when there exist action profiles that allow
the simultaneous satisfaction of all players. The notion
of SE has been formalized in the context of pure and
mixed strategies and its existence and uniqueness has
been studied. In particular, when no SE exists neither
in pure nor mixed strategies, necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of an epsilon-SE has been
presented. However, not all games in SF possess an
ǫ-SE. Finally, a learning dynamics has been proposed
to achieve SE. In particular, we remark that it requires
only 1-bit feedback messages between the corresponding
transmitter-receiver pairs. Nonetheless, the convergence
remains still conditioned. This suggests that the design
of algorithms such that at least one SE is learned in finite
time and in a fully distributed fashion remains being an
open problem.
APPENDIX A
POTENTIAL GAMES WITH CONSTRAINED SET OF
ACTIONS
In this appendix we present a generalization of a class
of games known as exact potential games (PG)[33].
We refer to this new class of games as constrained
exact potential games. First, consider a game in normal
form with constrained strategies and denote it by G =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K , {gk}k∈K
)
. Let the set Fk ⊂ A
be the graph of the correspondence gk, hence,
Fk = {(ak,a−k) ∈ A : ak ∈ gk (a−k)} . (46)
The set Fk determines the action profiles which can
be observed as outcomes of the game G, when only
player k is allowed to play given any action profile a−k
for which the set gk (a−k) is not empty. Following this
reasoning, the set of all possible outcomes of the game
G corresponds to the following set
F =
K⋂
j=1
Fj , (47)
which is the set of action profiles such that ∀a ∈ F , it
holds that ∀k ∈ K, ak ∈ gk (a−k). Unilateral deviations
of a set of players from any action profile a ∈ F might
lead to action profiles which do not belong to F . The
following set
ÙF = K⋃
j=1
Fj , (48)
contains all possible unilateral deviations one can ob-
serve from any action in the set F . Using both sets F
and ÙF , we introduce the definition of exact constrained
potential game.
Definition 13 (Exact Constrained PG (ECPG)): Any
game in normal form with constrained set of actions
G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K , {gk}k∈K
)
is an exact
constrained potential game (ECPG) if there exists a
function φ : ÙF → R such that for all a ∈ ÙF , it holds
that, for all k ∈ K and for all a′k ∈ gk (a−k),
uk(ak,a−k)− uk(a
′
k,a−k) = φ(ak,a−k)− φ(a
′
k,a−k).
Before we continue, we clearly state that not all the
the properties of potential games [33] hold for the
constrained potential games. For instance, not all exact
constrained PG have an equilibrium. In the following,
we introduce two results regarding the existence of an
equilibrium in pure strategies in ECPG.
Theorem 14 (Existence of an equilibrium in ECPG):
The finite exact constrained potential game
G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K , {gk}k∈K
)
, with potential
function φ : ÙF → R+, has at least one equilibrium in
pure strategies, if the sets F1, . . . ,FK , are non-empty
and identical.
Proof: By assumption, the set F (47) is non-empty.
Thus, there exists at least one feasible outcome a∗ ∈ F
for the game G. Now, for all k ∈ K, any unilateral
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deviation of player k from an action profile a∗ leads to
an action profile of the form
Ä
ak,a
∗
−k
ä
∈ ÙF . Similarly,
by assumption, both sets F and ÙF are identical, thus, any
unilateral deviation from a feasible action profile is also
a feasible action profile. Now, without any loss of gener-
ality, let the elements of the sets F =
¶
A˜(1), . . . , A˜(N)
©
be indexed following any particular order such that the
following holds,
φ
Ä
A˜(1)
ä
6 φ
Ä
A˜(2)
ä
6 . . . 6 φ
Ä
A˜(N)
ä
, (49)
with N = |F|. Thus, from Def. 9, it holds that A˜(N)
is an equilibrium of the game G , which completes the
proof.
APPENDIX B
MULTIPLICITY OF THE ESE
In this appendix, we study the multiplicity of the equi-
librium of the potential game with constrained strategies
G˜ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
. For doing so,
we take advantage of the fact that it is a potential game
with constrained action sets and thus, we analyze the
auxiliary game G˜′ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {φ}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
.
Note that this choice does not imply any lost of gener-
ality, since the set of GNE of both games are identical.
In the following, we use some tools from graph
theory to determine the number of ESE which
a given game in efficient-satisfaction form G˜ =(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
can possess. We start
by indexing the elements of the action set A in any given
order using the index n ∈ I = {1, . . . , |A|}. Denote by
a(n) =
(
a
(n)
1 , . . . , a
(n)
K
)
the n-th element of the action
set A. Consider that each action profile a(n) is associated
with a vertex xn in a given directed graph G. There
exists an arc from vertex xn to another vertex xm, if
the action profile represented by the latter a(m) can be
obtained from the former a(n) by changing the action of
only one player and lower potential (sum of efforts) is
obtained. For instance, if the unique deviator is player
k, then, a(m)k ∈ fk
(
a
(n)
−k
)
and φ
Ä
a(n)
ä
> φ
Ä
a(m)
ä
.
More precisely, the graph G can be defined by the pair
G = (X ,B), where the set X =
¶
x1, . . . , x|A|
©
(nodes)
contains the nodes representing the action profiles in the
set A and B (edges) is a non-symmetric matrix with
dimensions |A| × |A| and entries defined as follows
∀(n,m) ∈ I2 and n 6= m,
bn,m =


1 if (i) ∃! k ∈ K : a(n)k 6= a
(m)
k ,
(ii)a
(m)
k ∈ fk
(
a
(n)
−k
)
(iii) φ
Ä
a(m)
ä
< φ
Ä
a(n)
ä
0 otherwise ,
(50)
and bi,i = 0 for all i ∈ I .
A realistic assumption is to consider that for any pair
of action profiles a(n) and a(m) which are adjacent,
we have that φ(a(n)) 6= φ(a(m)). This is because
players assign different effort values to their actions.
From the definition of the matrix B, we have that a
necessary and sufficient condition for a vertex xn to
represent an ESE action profile is to have a null out-
degree in the oriented graph G, i.e., there are no outgoing
edges from the node xn (sink vertex). Finally, one can
conclude that determining the set of ESE in the game
G˜ =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {ck}k∈K , {fk}k∈K
)
boils down to
identifying all the sink vertices in the oriented graph
G. That is, exploiting the fact that, if the n-th row of
the matrix B is a null-vector, then the action a(n) is
an ESE of the game G˜. Interestingly, a particular case
arises when the resulting graph is an edgeless graph,
i.e., the corresponding matrix B is a null matrix. In this
case, the set of SE would be identical to the set of ESE,
which implies that the idea of associating an effort to
each action is not enough to select an ESE among the
set of SE. In any case, determining the exact set of SE
would require the analysis of the matrix B, which might
be highly demanding and requires complete information.
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